“…Israel was the trigger of the 1956 Suez intervention.
After Nasser became president in 1954, the British Navy withdrew from Egypt but retained the right to return in case of crisis. Britain did not accept a complete loss of control. Nasser’s move was therefore seen as both a strategic and symbolic threat.
Diplomatic efforts between August and October 1956 failed. On October 22–24, Britain, France, and Israel agreed on a secret amphibious plan at Sèvres near Paris. Israel was not an auxiliary actor but the operational spearhead. Since Britain and France lacked international legitimacy to directly attack Egypt, Israel initiated the war by attacking Sinai on October 29, 1956. Britain and France then intervened under the pretext of separating the parties and securing the canal.
It also should be noted that Israel became a de facto nuclear power around 1967, although it has never officially acknowledged it. The foundations of this capability were laid in the late 1950s, directly following the 1956 Suez Crisis. That crisis created a strategic alignment between Israel and France. Seeking to counter Gamal Abdel Nasser’s effect in Algeria, France agreed to provide Israel with critical nuclear assistance, including the Dimona reactor and the technological basis for plutonium production. At the same time, Israel drew a key lesson from the crisis that great powers, including the United States, could not be relied upon for ultimate security. This combination—French technology transfer and a deepened sense of strategic isolation—pushed Israel toward developing an independent nuclear deterrent. In this sense, the Suez Crisis was not just a regional conflict; it was the decisive turning point that enabled Israel’s emergence as a nuclear power.
Academic studies and memoirs clearly show that Israel consciously assumed the role of first aggressor and enabled the military start of the 1956 operation. The crisis was not a spontaneous tripartite conflict but a coordinated intervention, with Israeli geopolitics at its core. Israel entered Sinai on October 29, Britain and France launched airstrikes on October 31, and landings took place in Port Said on November 5th – 6th.
Eisenhower’s Reaction
U.S. President Dwight Eisenhower strongly opposed the intervention, which had been carried out without informing him. He believed it weakened the Western bloc and pushed newly independent states toward the Soviet Union. Prime Minister Anthony Eden initially resisted, expecting military success.
The U.S. applied financial pressure by restricting oil supplies and blocking IMF support. The British pound came under severe strain. As a result, a ceasefire was declared on November 6th. Britain and France withdrew in December, and Israel left Sinai by March 1957. Within days, Britain’s imperial power effectively collapsed—not militarily, but financially under U.S. pressure…”